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I.

INTRODUCTION

Actually very little analysis is required to show that an ideal
world is better than a state of laissez faire, unless the
definitions of a state of laissez faire and an ideal world happen
to be the same. But the whole discussion is largely irrelevant
for questions of economic policy since whatever we may have
in mind as our ideal world, it is clear that we have not yet
discovered how to get to it from where we are. A better
approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a
situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine
the effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to
decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or
worse than the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy
would have some relevance to the actual situation.!
Those of us involved in the economic aspects of natural
resource use are laboring in the realm of applied welfare
economics. That is, we are analyzing various social policies and
institutions to determine their appropriateness for certain, often
elusive and contradictory goals of society. 2 To help us in this task,
we employ economics, biology, social psychology, and various
other aids. Unfortunately, and in spite of a large body of
literature in economics, political science, and philosophy, it is
usually agreed that we have no general criteria by which we can
determine whether or not a certain social or economic
configuration leads us to an "optimum social state." 3 The
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1.Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, J. LAW & EcON., 43 (Oct. 1960).
2. When economists use the term "institutions" it generally refers to the
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nonexistence of a social welfare function-a unique ordering of
individual preferences summed over all people-precludes the
precise definition of this "optimum."
Thus by necessity, we must depend in part on the political
process to synthesize group preferences, articulate social goals,
and specify the appropriate areas for public intervention. Implicit
and explicit budget allocation, project ranking, or legislative
ranking formulae are widely used in government. In the
economist's analytical framework these can sometimes be
interpreted as decision rules derived from a constrained
maximization process. But, as will be seen below, social objectives
are not unambiguously conceived nor maximized and this fact
leaves considerable room for political maneuvering.
We are of the opinion, however, that a rudimentary social
decision model can be conceived to aid in the above process. Such
a model should possess at least the following attributes which we
borrow from our colleague Irving Fox.
I. For a given problem or opportunity, the process
should develop the best practicable information about the
options available and their consequences which are of interest
to various individuals and groups affected by the potential
decision.
2. Individuals and groups affected should have a
reasonable opportunity to be apprised of information about
available options.
3. The process should provide reasonable opportunity
for those affected by a decision to influence those who make
the final decision.
4. The process should operate so that the products and
services produced serve a range of preferences (not inconsistent
with majority preferences) rather than a single set of
preferences.
5. The decision-making process should function with
reasonable dispatch and efficiency in generating information,
evaluating it, and in reaching a final decision.
6. Implementing machinery must be responsible to the
decisions made and be capable of integrating the components
of interrelated activities so as to take into account their impact
upon one another and achieve the degree of coordination
envisaged by the decision.
7. Information generated in the course of operating
experience should feed back into the decision-making system so
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that initial decisions can4be modified, if necessary, in response
to such new information.
To relate this concept to the fishery, we must recognize the
various components in the chain from ocean to consumer,
elucidate the ramifications of alternative social policy, and
enlighten affected persons of these ramifications. Examples of
components 'are natural wealth (fish stocks), physical yield,
fishermen's incomes, incomes of fishing supplies firms,
processors' incomes, retailers' incomes, incomes of all laborers
engaged in the above activities, and consumer preferences.
To trace through the various components, consider fish
stocks. Ideally, one can express current levels of fish stocks
(biomass) as a function of recruitment, growth, and natural
mortality. As long as fishing does not occur, these three primary
influences will govern the size of the population and its weight. All
three variables are in turn a function of the biomass and its
relationship to its environment. Recruitment refers to the process
of young fish successfully joining the adult (breeding) population.
Recruitment is low at very low populations for obvious reasons.
Recruitment may also be low at very large population levels (in
relation to environment) because the fish are not healthy, and
there is severe competition for food. At some intermediate
population level, the ability of the population to recruit progeny
is at a maximum. Growth rate of individual fish is likewise
dependent upon relative density; at low population levels the
growth rate of the individual is at a maximum, decreasing as a
function of the standing population. Natural mortality, on the
other hand, is low for very low population levels, but increases as
a function of the fish population.
The next component is fish catch and several influences can
alter the magnitude of this catch. Fishing technology, weather,
other physical parameters, and fishermen's expectations (and
actions) are several which enter here. The magnitude of the catch
has implications for two components: 1) quantity of fish to be
processed; and 2) the level of fishermen's incomes. The first has
implications for the level of income to processors, and the sale of
supplies to processors (which in turn has implications for income
4. Address by I. Fox, North Central Region Research Project (NC-57) Technical
Committee Annual Meeting, Jan. 14, 1969.
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levels of those selling supplies to processors). The final step before
the consumer is that of the retailer. This component influences the
level of retailer's incomes, the quantity of retailing supplies sold,
and hence the income of those firms supplying the retail
component with goods and services.
Going back to the level of fishermen's incomes, this
influences the quantity of fishing supplies sold, and in turn the net
income level of those firms supplying fishermen. Also, the level of
household consumption items sold to fishermen is influenced by
their income and this in turn affects the net income of other
businesses quite unrelated to the fishery.
It should be obvious that the impacts which can emanate
from a change in the institutional constraints on the fishery can
be significant, both in magnitude, and in extent. Before turning
to a discussion of an actual legislative act to alter existing fishery
institutions, we digress to a brief discussion of several popular
goals for domestic fisheries. This digression is by no means
exhaustive; it is intended merely to specify some possible social
goals, and to briefly discuss some of their advantages and
disadvantages. Also, we will later discuss the nine-mile contiguous
zone within the context of these social objectives.
II.

THE CRITERIA PROBLEM

One of the interesting aspects of social policy in the fishery
is the multiplicity of possible goals which could be pursued. In this
section we will briefly discuss eight of them. These are: 1)
maximization of sustained physical yield from the sea; 2)
production of a certain quantity annually into perpetuity; 3)
maximization of fleet profits; 4) maximization of the nation's
long-range fishing capability; 5) minimization of total cost
devoted to producing fish; 6) minimization of costs for total food
production (from both land and sea); 7) the use of the sea as a
source of protein for foreign trade; and finally 8) counteract
" economic decline of fishing communities.
Maximize Sustained Yield

The maximization of sustained yield from the fishery was,
and may remain a significant force in fishery management. Its
drawbacks have been adequately summarized by many
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economists, starting with Scott Gordon. 5 It is unnecessary to

repeat all of the reasons why this goal is irrational from a social
point of view but two paramount considerations, one on the
demand side, and one on the supply side will be discussed.
Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming of maximizing
sustained yield from the fishery is that it ignores completely any

notion of consumer demand for fish. In an idealized market
economy, consumer sovereignty holds sway and consumers

"vote" with dollars. To commit the nation to such a policy could

be considered senseless without consideration for the preferences

of consumers.
On the supply side, producers respond to signals they receive
from consumers ("votes") concerning the kinds and quantities of

products desired. The cost of producing an additional unit is
important to the firm since it must stop production short of the
point where the return from that last unit is less than its cost.
When sustained yield of the fishery is maximized at the complete
disregard for the costs of producing that quantity, society may be

paying more to catch fish than it should since some of the
resources committed to fishing could produce greater value in

other productive activities. Without clear indication of both
demand and supply (cost) conditions, the setting of policy on
physical ternis is quite unsound.

An interesting enigma is found here, however, and was
recently articulated by Frederick W. Bell of the Bureau of

Commercial Fisheries

He found that by using the notion of

producers' and consumers' surpluses to represent economic
benefits from the Bureau's programs, 7 efforts to reduce harvesting

costs through investments in gear research, fish forecasting
5. Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, J.
POL. ECONOMY 124-42 (1954).

6. Bu. Comm. Fish., Working Paper No. 31 (Oct. 1969), Benefit-Cost Analysis as
Applied to Commercial Fisheries Program.
7. Consumer's surplus is defined to be the excess of what a consumer would be willing
to pay for an item over that amount which he has to pay; the vertical distance from the
price line to the demand curve. The total consumers' surplus is merely the sum of all of
these individual increments-the definite integral under the demand curve, above the price
line, and to the left of the intersection of the demand and supply curves. Producers' supply
is defined as the excess of actual earnings from a given quantity of product over the
minimum amount the firm would accept to produce it. It is reckoned as the definite
integral above the supply curve, below the price line, and to the left of the intersection of
the supply and demand curves.
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techniques, and vessel design would result in positive economic
benefits for domestic fisheries currently producing at less than
maximum sustained yield, and negative benefits if they are
producing at or beyond maximum sustained yield. The
implication is that while maximizing sustained yield is the wrong
criterion, its implications for certain policy cannot be completely
ignored; it can provide a rough guide for some decisions.
Producea Given Quantity Annually into Perpetuity
A variation on the above objective is to catch a specified
quantity of fish each year. This suffers from the same disregard
for supply and demand characteristics and we shall dismiss it as
an analogous objective to that of producing the maximum
sustained yield.
Maximize Fleet Profits
The traditional literature on the fishery treats each small
fishing ground as the focus of attention and advocates the
maximization of group profits on this ground. This profit is called
"rent to the resource" and is equated with some desirable social
goal. To achieve this, some fishermen are excluded so that others
may enjoy surplus profits. While this is not the place for an
extensive discussion of the shortcomings of this traditional
approach,' we will raise several important questions concerning its
desirability as a social objective.
The first issue to be raised concerns the traditional
assumption that each small fishing ground is a separate and
independent part of the ocean icomplex, and that "rent" should
be maximized on each ground Since the many subparts of an
ocean ecosystem are not ecologically independent, neither are they
economically independent. To construct economic optimizing
8. Since science is a dynamic and recursive process, the innovator, while getting credit

for his breakthrough, also is subject to much criticism from those who follow
him-criticism that would not have been possible had not the innovator made his
discovery. We applaud the early work of Gordon [The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole
Ownership, J. POL. ECONOMY 116 (1955)], and others and in no way are demeaning their

contributions to the understanding of the economics of fisheries.
9. For a different interpretation of this "rent" and other issues see Bu. Comm. Fish.,
Econ. Research Div., Working Paper No. 28 (July 1969), Bromley, Economic Efficiency
in Common Property NaturalResource Use: A Case Study of the Ocean Fishery. Also,

for other writings displaying varying degrees of criticism of the traditional approach see
Bu. Comm. Fish., Econ. Research Div., Working Paper No. 12 (Mar. 1969), Carlson, Bio-
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models on interrelated subsets of a larger biological complex is to
beg the ultimate question of desirable management of the total
ocean resource; optimizing with respect to each subsystem could
very well be inappropriate for the entire ocean system. This being
the case, one solution would be to treat the ocean complex as one
large biological "enterprise" and devise a social harvesting
scheme which can lead to the attainment of those goals specified
by society. But to argue that some fishermen should be excluded
to increase profits of those allowed to stay would seem to show
disregard for those forced out, and may treat them in isolation
from the social problem of their alternative occupations and
earning power (which reflects their contribution to society outside
of the fishery).
The ultimate question concerns the appropriate degree of
aggregation necessary to correctly analyze the fishery. The
traditional literature treats the ground as the "decision unit" and
advocates maximizing return to it. Ordinarily we would talk of
the fishing firm as the appropriate decision unit and judge the
performance of the industry in more conventional terms. Because
of the common property aspects of the fishery, the usual
guidelines for performance have not been attempted but we would
suggest that this may be a potentially useful endeavor for
economists experienced in market performance studies.
A second issue concerns the level of capital investment in the
fishery. Most writers have concluded that investment in a
common property fishery is excessive, and hence inefficient. Yet
a recent article by Vernon L. Smith, which is written in response
to a "need for generalization, explication, and integration of this
previous work"' 0 states that, "It does not follow from the models
of the present paper that capital requirements are greater or that
output (sustainable yield) is unambiguously either larger or
smaller under competition than under sole ownership." 11 Later, he
concludes: "These results, insofar as they stand in contrast
to the earlier literature, are due to the explicit hypothesis
Economic Model ofa Fishery; Schaefer, Some Considerationsof PopulationDynamics and
Economics in Relation to the Management of the Commercial Marine Fisheries, J.
FISHERIES RESEARCH BD. OF CAN. 669 (1957); and Bu. Comm. Fish., Econ. Research Div.,
Working Paper No. 21 (May 1969), Van Meir, An Economic Analysis of Policy
Alternativesfor Managingthe Georges Bank Haddock Fisheries.
10. Smith, On Models of Commercial Fishing, J.POL. EcONOMY 181, 182 (1969).
11. Id. at 191.
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that population reduction increases operating cost, while at first
increasing, then decreasing, sustainable yield."'"
All of the above merely point to the fact that even a social
goal which seems to find considerable favor in the literature does
not lead unambiguously to the attainment of efficient resource
use. The presence of considerable uncertainty in a fishery, and the
lack of perfect knowledge on the part of biologists and
economists, places the conclusions of traditional writers-who
favor maximizing fleet profits-alongside other possible
conclusions as candidates for acceptance. We would conclude that
much serious economic analysis is in order before we can make
sweeping conclusions about efficiency, or the lack thereof, in a
common property fishery.
Maximize Long-Range FishingCapability
Those people who worry about national prestige and physical
comparisons with other nations suffer considerable disutility from
the nature of our fishing fleet. They envision the appropriate goal
as that of "fielding" the largest, fastest, and most modern fishing
fleet in the world, capable of outdistancing, outlasting, and
outfishing any other present or potential competitor. While these
people often are members of Congress, their position is probably
explained by a vociferous constituency and hence it may be
worthwhile to briefly explore this social objective.
Not unlike the goal of maximizing sustained yield from the
fishery, the commitment to maximize catching capability is made
in isolation from the demand (present or future) for fish and fish
products, and in isolation from the costs of achieving this goal.
Put another way, the decision would be made in isolation of any
considerations as to alternative sources of food supply and would
require the assumption that the nation would be able to either
consume or exchange the entire quantity of fish caught.
The other consideration to be given such a commitment is
that it would require government operation, or at least
government franchising. This objective would obviously conflict
with established mores concerning the value of competitive
businesses, but would find company in present franchising of
various public utilities such as telephone and electric services.
12. Id. at 194.
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Minimize Cost Devoted to Catching Fish
This goal perhaps seems more defensible than any of the
preceding ones but suffers from not considering the demand for
the product. The objective is to catch a certain amount annually,
yet without proper regard for consumer preferences, this makes
suboptimization a potential hazard. Nonetheless, the goal makes
sense if the political decision is made to catch a certain quantity
of fish, although problems arise in implementation. It may require
government harvesting through a public fishing enterprise, or the
franchising of a private corporation. Under either alternative it
would imply the demise of the competive fishery and in spite of
those who would welcome this solution, we merely caution that
this is in direct conflict with other social objectives, at least one
of which we will discuss momentarily.
Minimize Cost Devoted to Total Food Production
Fish are but one aspect of the nation's food supply and many
would argue that it should not be treated in isolation from the
larger issue of total food production. Consider the nation's need
for protein and assume this is somehow manifest as a demand for
a given quantity per unit of time. It is possible to express this need
as some given quantity per year and conceptualize the situation
depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Ideal allocation of protein production between land and sea
sources.

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

Imagine that since the sea produces protein in a form that is
easily converted to a useful state, small quantities of it can be
produced more cheaply than is possible with land-based
agriculture. There, protein production is rather inefficient and
initially costs more per unit (ACL) than for protein produced from
the sea (ACs). However, because of the finite nature of fish stocks
in any one season, as the population diminishes through
harvesting it becomes more expensive to catch the remaining fish.
As a result, the total costs of the group of vessels pursuing fish
rises at a rate proportionately greater than group output. This
implies increasing per-unit costs (ACs) and increasing marginal
costs (MCs).
Meanwhile, in land-based food production, assume the cost
of producing a unit of protein per time period is constant as the
quantity produced increases. To talk about the "ideal"
combination of protein from land and sea requires that costs be
minimized and the relevant functions to ascertain this desideratum
are MCs and MCL. The cost-minimizing combination is to
produce Oq" from the sea, and q-q0 from land.
While .this model can be helpful in allocating protein
production between land and sea, its utility is not generalizable to
comparing fish with red meat. One must have specific information
about the demand for these two commodities and be much more
sophisticated than we have been here. However, when talking of
a homogeneous commodity such as pure protein, the above model
would appear helpful.
Implementation may be another matter. Supposedly,
producers in each of the two areas would receive signals telling
them how to behave, but given that land-based food production
is so fraught with artificial signals (commodity price supports,
subsidized management advice, institutional rigidities, etc.), and
that sea-based protein production has its own set of built-in
problems (biological constraints, uncertainty), it is quite unlikely
that anything workable could be conceived in the immediate
future.
Use Fish as Source for Foreign Trade

A slight variation of maximizing our long-range fishing
capability, tainted by a trace of selfishness or benevolence
depending upon one's views, would be the catching of more fish
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than we annually consume to sell to nations with underdeveloped
fishing capabilities, or with total food supply problems. The
proponents of such a policy argue that the rich nations have a
moral obligation to help feed poorer nations, and besides, we reap
some gains in the transaction to stimulate our fishing industry.
Cynics would argue that this bespeaks colonialism and that
what we should do is assist these countries to develop their own
harvesting capabilities with the eventual goal of permitting them
to be self-sufficient.
In either case, the objective would require considerable
thought as regards efficiency and equity to be certain about its
desirability.
Counteract Economic Decline of Fishing Communities
The final objective for fisheries management to be discussed
here might be phrased in terms of enhancing the relative position
of the poorer coastal communities. As this nation has developed,
and transportation has improved, certain "growth centers" have
evolved to capture the majority of increases in economic activity.
Because the towns which now are part of the "communities left
behind" had little to offer in the way of favorable location,
natural resources, or human resources, they have lost ground in
their struggle for a piece of the economic action, and correctly so.
However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that people are
dissatisfied with what economists would label as the epitome of
the principle of comparative advantage and have joined forces to
counteract this trend.
The initial efforts take the chamber-of-commerce approach
which relies on the hypothesis that their community is lagging due
to ignorance; ignorance on the part of consumers and producers
as regards that community's attributes (its comparative
advantage). When this approach fails to reach satisfactory
fruition, the next step is to organize support at the "grassroots"
for intervention into the normal workings of the economic system.
Various "area redevelopment" programs are of this nature and
seek to correct what people perceive to be a dissatisfaction with
the results of the market.
Thus, it may be that one objective of fishery policy could be
to counteract the demise of coastal communities that service the
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fishing industry. This is water-based Jeffersonian agrarianism at
its best and if carried to its logical conclusion would discourage
the development of modern harvesting equipment, improved
refrigeration facilities, and better modes of transportation.
Instead, there is impetus on keeping as much raw product in the
immediate area for processing; processing raw commodities
generates considerable value-added for local. c6mmunities and
although leakage of this money is inevitable, the more times it can
be spent locally before leaving the area the greater will be the
multiplier effect.
In the foregoing we have listed eight possible objectives for
fisheries management, none of them necessarily mutually
exclusive, and several of them internally inconsistent. They are
presented merely to set the stage for our discussion of a legislated
institutional change-the nine-mile contiguous zone. We will then
do two things: 1) relate the objectives of the legislation to the
above possible goals for fisheries management; and 2) discuss the
entire process of change in the context of our social decision
model.
III.

PERCEIVED PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC ACTION: THE NINE-MILE
CONTIGUOUS ZONE

An Act:
To establish a contiguous fishery zone beyond the
territorial sea of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, that there is established a fisheries zone contiguous
to the territorial sea of the United States. The United States
will exercise the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries in
the zone as it has in its territorial sea, subject to the
continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this
zone as may be recognized by the United States.
Sec. 2. The fisheries zone has as its inner boundary the
outer limits of the territorial sea and its seaward boundary a
line drawn so that each point on the line is nine nautical miles
from the nearest point on the inner boundary.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President determines that a portion
of the fisheries zone conflicts with the territorial waters or
fishery zone of another country, he may establish a seaward
boundary for such portion of the zone in substitution for the
seaward boundary as described in Section 2.
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Sec. 4. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
extending the jurisdiction of the States to the natural resources
beneath and in the waters within the fisheries zone established
by this Act or as diminishing their jurisdiction to such
resources beneath 3and in the waters of the territorial seas of
the United States.1
On October 14, 1966, the 89th Congress passed the above
legislation 4 and within seven months the State Department had
negotiated treaties with Russia 5 and Japan that would allow
commercial fishing within portions of the nine-mile contiguous
zone off the Alaska, Washington and Oregon coasts. We now turn
to a discussion of this legislation in the context of problem
perception.
The improvement of human well being or welfare is the single
objective of government action, legislation, or expenditure -in a
completely open, nondictatorial and rationally governed society.
In an idealistic sense this objective is without argument. The
problem arises when one realizes there is no direct measure of
welfare. One can conclude that the welfare objective, by itself,
does not offer useful guidance to the decision-maker for choosing
among alternative expenditure or legislative choices.
Welfare can be viewed as composed of many separate benefits
such as increased income, education, improved health, flood
control, etc. The decision process becomes more complex with the
elucidation of multiple objectives, although it also becomes more
meaningful because the objectives are defined operationally. Cruel
choices between competing ends now arise. It is clear that the
identification of the multiple benefits which compose welfare also
does not provide the necessary guidance for choice among
alternatives. Rather than become involved in an extended
discussion of the analytical tools which may be utilized by
decision-makers we will attempt to show the complexity of the
benefits associated with governmental action as regards the
commercial fishing industry. The nine-mile contiguous fisheries
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1091-1094 (1966).
14. Id.
15. Agreement with U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed in Washington, D.C. Feb. 13, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 190, T.I.A.S. No. 6218.

16. Agreement with U.S. and Japan signed in Tokyo, May 9, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 1309,
T.I.A.S. No. 6287.
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zone will offer an excellent case study of governmental action
since we can point to some obvious implications which were not
considered for the industry.
Before beginning a short historical statement on the events
which led to passage of the nine-mile contiguous zone legislation,
it would be useful to discuss governmental action. Governmental
action can be stated simply and ideally as a response by
government to constituents and the problems perceived by these
constituents. A danger in this idealistic statement is the
assumption that the problem perceived by the constituents is
passed to Congress and governmental agencies unencumbered by
a new perception of the problems as it moves through the process.
It would seem that this is necessary so that action (solutions)
generated reflects and solves the constituents' initial problems.
Also there is a danger that the problem as it is perceived by
constituents is not the real problem, but merely'a statement of the
symptoms of a larger problem.
It is most often the case that a single objective for increasing
welfare to a group of constituents will run headlong into the
multiple objectives for increasing the welfare of society as a whole.
Additionally, there is no guarantee that the choices made by
governmental bodies will maximize the single objective of the
group of constituents through the solution-generating process.
Frequently, the solution generated treats the symptoms of the
problem rather than the problem itself, or it creates a set of new
problems.
The problem as perceived by a group of constituents which
culminated in the nine-mile contiguous fisheries zone grew out of
the presence of Russian fishing trawlers along the Washington and
Oregon coasts at a distance estimated to be 20-30 miles. It should
be noted that Russian deep sea fishing operations are
characteristically a factory-ship operation and are capable of
spending months at sea moving from fishing ground to fishing
ground harvesting fish. The commercial fishermen of Washington
perceived this action as a two-fold problem: 1) foreign fleets were
fishing in international waters which were thought to be
traditional United States fishing waters, and 2) the foreign fleets
were more technologically advanced and efficient than the
domestic fishing fleets-they posed the threat of reducing the
fishable biomass to be exploited by U.S. fishermen. It was clear
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to this group of constituents that they were1 7at a comparative
disadvantage relative to foreign fleet operations.
The original problem can thus be thought of as one of a
regional nature. The constituents expressed concern to their
elected representatives in Congress. Representatives Thomas N.
Downing of Virginia and Thomas M. Pelly of Washington, and
Senators F. L. Bartlett of Alaska and Warren G. Magnuson of
Washington perceived the problem as a national issue, however,
with regional implications and sponsored the nine-mile contiguous
18
fishery zone legislation in the House and Senate, respectively.
Two major arguments were presented in these bodies as
justification for the legislation: 1) the United States had fallen
from second to fifth in total pounds of fish landed per year among
fishing nations of the world; and 2) the legislation would act as a
conservation measure to protect the species of fish subject to
exploitation by foreign fleets adjacent to U.S. shores.' One can
readily see that the problem set suddenly became a national issue
rather than a regional issue.
The Department of Commerce, after being informed by the
U.S. Department of the Interior that there was no significant
exploitation in the nine-mile contiguous zone,20 concluded that the
establishment of such a zone would not reduce the importation of
fish and fishery products, and thus would not aid the balance of
payments deficit!' The Department of Commerce also stated that
there would be no direct benefit to the commercial fishing industry
on economic grounds, and therefore recommended against the
enactment of the legislation.
The Department of the Navy expressed no opposition to the
legislation because it did not conflict with the freedom-of-the-seas
doctrine relative to warships and aircraft. 3
The Department of the Interior pointed out that prior to the
legislation, U.S. fishermen were almost exclusively the only
commercial fishing activity in the nine-mile zone?4 However, with
17. Hearings on Fisheries Legislation Before the Committee on Merchant Marineand
Fisheries,89th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. 89-24 at 225 (1966).
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id. at 245.
21. Id.
22. Id.

23. Id. at 246.
24. Id.
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the growth of large-scale fishing operations by foreign fleets, the
demand for exclusive rights by segments of U.S. commercial
fishermen had grown and the legislation offered a measure
through which a portion of this demand could be met.
Approximately eleven percent of the average of 5100 million
pounds of fish caught by U.S. fishermen between.the years 1959
and 1963 was caught in the nine-mile zone under consideration,'
and passage of the legislation would guarantee approximately the
same ratio if exclusive rights were given to U.S. commercial
fishermen 6
The U.S. Department of the Interior also expressed the
possibility of reprisal by foreign nations on U.S. fishing fleets
fishing near their shores?27 From a fisheries standpoint, the U.S.
Department of the Interior did not object to the legislation
because the advantages were balanced with the disadvantages. 8
However, the nine-mile contiguous fishery zone would be of little
value to the fisheries conservation problem because of the
migratory nature of fish.?
The U.S. Department of State offered no objections to the
fishery zone,3 nor did the Treasury Department3 The Treasury
Department, which at the time of the hearings had jurisdiction
over the U.S. Coast Guard, pointed out that there were no
penalties for violation of the zone by foreign fleets. Even without
penalties, patrol by the Coast Guard would likely deter violation
of the zone but would necessitate additional operating expenses?
As pointed out earlier, Congressional advocates argued on
the grounds of conservation and a need to enhance the
international position of the U.S. fishing industry. However, the
segment of the commercial fishing industry most directly
concerned with the legislation argued from the position of the
technology gap, and sought protection. They couched their
argument, however, on the basis of conservation and found
sympathetic ears among members of Congress. In summary, the
25. Id. at 247.
26. Id.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.

31. Id. at 249.

32. Id.
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industry message to Congress was that stocks -of fish must be
protected if the United States' production was to be maintained
at its present level, and fish stocks not yet utilized by U.S.
commercial fishermen must be harvested on a sustained yield
basis to prevent their extermination.
This should not imply that the commercial fishing industry
was unanimous in the above position. Two segments" which
disagreed with the nine-mile contiguous zone were the tuna and
shrimp commercial fishing industries. The tuna industry argued
that the legislation:
I) established a unilateral extension of sovereignty;
2) would create indefinite boundaries from U.S. shores;
3) offered a concept unsupported by existing international law;
and
4) would have a serious impact on the Geneva convention.
The tuna industry argued that there would be a detrimental
effect on the issue of territorial seas and that an undesirable
precedent would be set. Also, the legislation offered no solutions
to the current problems facing the tuna industry, primarily access
to fishing grounds.
The shrimp industry pointed out that nature does not
recognize imaginary boundaries, therefore the conservation effect
of the legislation would be minimal. This industry also recognized
that each fishery has separate problems for which separate
solutions are needed. There is no universal panacea which will
resolve all problems.
We now turn to a brief discussion of the implications for
rational intervention in the fishery.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Those of us involved with evaluating public intervention
argue that there are certain minimal tests which must be passed
before intervention is justified; that is, there are both necessary
conditions, and sufficient conditions for this intervention. By
necessary conditions we mean the existence of a situation where
it is obvious that the present status leads to unfavorable results.
33. Id. at 313-15.
34. Id. at 319-22.
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Examples are found in such areas as conservation, health care for
the aged, social security, national defense, some transportation,
and utilities, to name but a few. While this test can often be rather
easy to conduct, the test of sufficiency is much more difficult.
By a sufficiency test we mean the following: 1) develop
hypotheses regarding the performance of both the private and
public sectors; 2) establish a basis for comparison of the situation
both with and without intervention; 3) identify intervention
alternatives with the idea in mind that public intervention may be
only one of several corrective aids; 4) compile empirical evidence
using the above steps as guides to insure asking the proper
questions; and 5) based upon the above analysis, offer
recommendations.
We have seen in the preceding case study that the sufficiency
test was not applied in reaching the decision to establish the ninemile contiguous zone. As we see it, the underlying problem in this
situation was the efficiency gap between domestic and foreign
fishing fleets. This problem was unclearly specified by the
constituents which then led to an unclear perception of the
problem by Congress. Since Congress had never articulated
specific goals for domestic fisheries, it had enough latitude to
transform the unclear problem into one relating to conservation
and national prestige.
We earlier argued that the type of action here considered
would be better conceived and implemented if it were
accompanied by a social decision model similar to the one
developed above. This model should present the best practicable
information about alternatives and their consequences; should
afford affected groups and individuals an opportunity to be made
aware of these likely impacts; should offer these parties some
opportunity of participation in the decision process; and should
permit the feedback of information so that initial decisions can be
modified. We traced through the many components of the system
from ocean to consumer and argued that many of these are
important enough to warrant access to information concerning
impacts from many institutional changes. Upon tracing through
the actual creation of the new legislation we saw how little thought
was given to the likely impact upon these various components.
Without imposing the informational requirements called for
in the above social decision model upon the kind of institutional

1970]

SOCIAL GOALS

change here considered, it is difficult to discern the beneficial
effects of the nine-mile contiguous zone. Certainly it is safe to say
that precious little thought was given to whether or not the ninemile zone was the best way to achieve some set of social goals in
the fishery. That is, even if the necessary conditions for public
intervention were met in this case, the sufficient conditions were
not even investigated. This means that no alternatives to solve the
problem were perused; it means that no hypothesis concerning
likely impact from these alternatives were advanced; it means no
empirical evidence was brought to bear on these hypotheses; 35 and
it means that there was no weighing of relative benefits and costs
from possible courses of action. That this is economic nonsense
is clear; that it is a legislative travesty is even more clear. That
we have a long way to go in implementing rational social action
in the fishery is indeed most lucid.
35. Few would submit that the testimony of politicians and representatives of various
government agencies comprise "bringing empirical evidence to bear" on the issues.

